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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that while the conclusion in Lowe was apparently inescapable, its use
as precedent should not be extended beyond cases identical to it
in all essential elements.
HENRY STANCILL MANNING, JR.
Criminal Law-Admissibility of Confessions
Davis, a prison escapee, was captured by police, who requested
and received permission of the warden of the state prison to keep
him temporarily in their custody. They suspected him of a recent
rape-murder. On Davis's being delivered to the city jail a notation
was made upon the arrest sheet that he was not to be allowed to use
the telephone and that no one was to be allowed to see him. Davis
was held in the city jail for the next sixteen days. During that time,
according to trial court findings, he was adequately fed, never
threatened, and, though questioned daily, not questioned overbear-
ingly.' On the sixteenth day of his detention, while he was being
questioned alone by a police officer acquainted with him and his
family, the officer made reference to a Bible held by Davis. Upon
inquiry he learned that Davis had been reading from the Bible, but
had not been praying because he did not know how. The police
officer recited a short, innocuous prayer. A moment later, Davis
confessed to the rape-murder.2
In December of 1959 Davis was convicted of the offense largely
on the basis of his confession. As is the practice in North Carolina,
determination of the "voluntariness" 3 of the confession was made by
' The facts as alleged by the prosecution and as alleged by defendant are
in complete conflict. Davis contended the instruction on the arrest sheet
was carried out; the state that it was ignored, which the trial court so held.
The defendant alleged that incarceration in the city jail was improper since
it was only an "over-night" jail and that prisoners held for more than a
day or two were normally detained in the county jail, which had proper
facilities for long detention; that rights under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-46
(Supp. 1963) had been violated because he had not been properly arraigned;
that he had been inadequately fed (the evidence established that he was
offered four sandwiches a day); that he was beaten and continually ques-
tioned. The trial court found no merit in any of these contentions.
2 The federal district court, upon hearing for application of a writ of
habeas corpus, found that the defendant requested that the officer pray for
him. The state court record indicated that the idea of the prayer originated
with the police officer. Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770, 773 n.6 (4th
Cir. 1964).
'The terminology "voluntary" and "involuntary" is uncertain of meaning
but popular among the judiciary not to be used. See Kamisar, What Is
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the trial judge.4 An objection to the confession's admission was
taken on the basis that it was involuntarily made. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the
confession was voluntary.5 After denial of a petition for certiorari
by the United States Supreme Court,6 defendant sought a writ of
habeas corpus in the federal district court.7 Although the result of
this writ has not been finally determined,8 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, in Davis v. North Carolina,9 recently affirmed
the district court's denial of the writ. This decision prompts this
note.
an "Involuntary" Confession? 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728, 741-47 (1963).
The true criterion is asserted by Professor Wigmore to be, "was the in-
ducement sufficient, by possibility, to elicit an untrue confession." 3 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 824 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
" North Carolina adheres to what is commonly called the "Massachusetts
rule," i.e., the trial judge determines the voluntariness of the confession
in the absence of the jury after hearing all the evidence on that issue.
If the confession is admitted by the judge, the jury then considers its
probative value. State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572 (1951).
See generally STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 187 (2d ed.
1963). The recent Supreme Court decision of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964), expressly approved the Massachusetts rule while holding that
any procedure in which the jury determined both voluntariness of the
confession and guilt deprives the defendant of liberty without due process of
law. See Note, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 381 (1964). For a general discussion of
the different procedures followed by trial courts in determining voluntariness,
see 3 WIGMORE § 861.
'State v. Davis, 253 N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365 (1960), 39 N.C.L. REV.
337 (1961).
'Davis v. North Carolina, 365 U.S. 855 (1961).
The writ of habeas corpus sought by Davis was denied after a hearing
in which the district court reviewed the state court record. Davis v. North
Carolina, 196 F. Supp. 488 (E.D.N.C. 1961). On appeal the Court of
Appeals of the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the state court's findings
of fact were not acceptable in the habeas corpus court, and remanded for a
full hearing as to the voluntariness of the confession. Davis v. North
Carolina, 310 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962). The district court in an evidentiary
hearing made detailed findings of fact and concluded that the confession was
voluntary. Davis v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1963).
'Docketed March 8, 1965, Current Term Miscellaneous Docket, No. 37,
U.S. Supreme Court.
' 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964). It is interesting to note that the Fourth
Circuit sat en banc when it heard the first appeal from the district court.
Chief Judge Sobeloff, who wrote the opinion of the majority, clearly indi-
cated his dissatisfaction with the police tactics used in obtaining the con-
fession. There was only one dissenter, Judge Haynesworth, the author of
the majority opinion in the second decision by the court of appeals. In
the second appearance before the court of appeals the arguments were
originally heard by Judges Sobeloff, Bell, and Haynesworth. By consent
of counsel the tape recording of the arguments was reheard by the court
en banc, and, as a result, the court affirmed the conviction. Judges Sobeloff
and Bell dissented.
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A majority of the court of appeals, upon their own independent
examination of the undisputed facts and the facts as found by the
trial court,10 agreed with the district court in finding the confession
voluntary.' However, two of the five judges vigorously dissented
and would have reversed on the ground that the confession was
involuntary.'" This difference of opinion is understandable when
examined in light of Supreme Court decisions on this issue.
Historically a confession was involuntary if the methods em-
ployed could have so overborne a defendant's will as to result in the
admission of a crime he had not committed, i.e., when the confession
was not deemed trustworthy.'" But, with the Court's decision in
Ashcraft v. Tennessee,"4 fourteenth amendment due process became
a determinate of admissibility.' The Court since has all but
abandoned the trustworthiness doctrine' and has been largely
" "[W]e are bound to make an independent examination of the record
to determine the validity of the claim. The performance of this duty cannot
be foreclosed by the finding of a court, or the verdict of a jury, or both."
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237-38 (1941). The Supreme Court
has also adopted a rule whereby it looks at "the totality of the circumstances
that preceded the confessions." Pikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197
(1957); accord, Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961). Although the two
rules are contrary to one another the Court has never been bothered by
this fact.
"The petitioner not only argued that the confession was coerced but
also that there had been a denial of the right to counsel. If the argument of
denial of counsel succeeds, under recent Court decisions the confession
would automatically be excluded. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
For a discussion of the question of the right to counsel, see 43 N.C.L. REv.
187 (1964). The court of appeals distinguished the principal case from
Escobedo on the basis of factual dissimilarity.
12 "In dealing with the issue of voluntariness of the confession, the court
entertains too narrow a concept of the scope of appellate review. It accepts
as virtually unreviewable findings of fact what [sic] in reality are erroneous
conclusions of law. Also it too readily defers to findings that are clearly
erroneous." 339 F.2d at 783 (dissenting opinion).
1.3 WIGMORE § 822.
1"322 U.S. 143 (1944).
15Id. at 154.
1 "To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be ... untrustworthy.
But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are not vol-
untary does not rest on this consideration." Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 541 (1961). See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Blackburn
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). But see INDAU &
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 152 (1962), who in-
terpret the opinions (there being no majority opinion) in Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), as a return by a majority of the Court to
the voluntary-trustworthy test. Professor Kamisar concludes "that Justice
Frankfurter's generous use of the 'voluntariness' terminology in Cidombe
v. Connecticut has thrown Inbau and Reid off course. Apparently, they
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guided by two principal factors in determining voluntariness: (1)
the personal characteristics of the defendant' 7 and (2) the outside
pressures applied to induce a confession."8 The Court's inability to
agree upon which of these factors shall weigh more heavily in
determining admissibility has led to much of the disagreement
among appellate judges on this issue.' 9 An application of both of
these factors to a particular factual situation has often been called
the subjective test.2" Characteristics such as age,
2" mentality,22
view the 'voluntariness' test as a synonym for the 'trustworthiness' or 're-
liability' test." Kamisar, supra note 3, at 741-42.
"'E.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Reck v. Pate, 367
U.S. 433 (1961).
",E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Cf. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963);
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960); all demonstrating the use of both factors, one weighing
more heavily than the other.
"The Supreme Court handed down twenty-six decisions between 1945
and 1964 dealing directly with the question of whether a confession was
coerced. Seven of the state court convictions were affirmed-all by divided
Courts. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433 (1958); Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958); Thomas
v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958) ; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) ;
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342
U.S. 55 (1951). Of the nineteen reversals of state court convictions only
three were unanimous. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Black-
burn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959). The remaining sixteen were by divided Courts. Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Town-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367
U.S. 433 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957);
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340
U.S. 881 (1950); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner
v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401 (1945). Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944), marked the final
instance of the sole reliance on the trustworthiness test, and all of the above
decisions have applied the due process provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment in determining voluntariness.
"0 See Way, The Supreme Court and State Coerced Confessions, 12
J. PUB. L. 53 (1963); Comment, 31 U. CiaI. L. Rnv. 313 (1964); 42
B.U.L. REv. 129 (1962); 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 209 (1963). Other writers
on the subject divide the cases since 1944 into two "classes" but do not
employ the terms "subjective" and "objective." See Kamisar, supra note
3; Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 35 (1962).
1 See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (14 years old); Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (15 years old); cf. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 (1961) (19 years old); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (19
years old); Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948) (17 years old).
"'See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate,
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race,23 and prior police record24 are weighed against such police
pressures as deprivation of food and sleep, 25 protracted questioning,
2"
incommunicado detention,27 and threats281 in order to determine
"whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he con-
fessed." 29 The due process grounds for this test are the unreliability
of the confession and the requirement of fairness in the criminal
process.30 On the other hand, a strict examination of the methods
used by the police to elicit a confession, with less regard to the power
of resistance of the defendant or the trustworthiness of the confes-
sion, is known as the objective test.3" The due process basis here
is solely the demand for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
procedure in the criminal processes, an unattainable goal so long
as a "coerced" confession is admissible.3 2 The purpose of this re-
367 U.S. 433 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
28 See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958);
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Harris v. South Carolina, 338
U.S. 68 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
2, See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck
v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
2 See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560 (1958); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944).
2" See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (16 hours);
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (8 hours); Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (8 hours); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958) (16 hours); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (23 hours).
2" See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
28 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945).
"Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963). "The limits in any
-ase depend upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the
power of resistance of the person confessing. What would be overpowering
to the weak of will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an ex-
perienced criminal." Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953).38Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
21 See note 20 supra.
"2Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). Thus the Court stated in
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961), that
we cannot but conclude that the question whether Rogers' con-
fessions were admissible into evidence was answered by reference
to a legal standard which took into account the circumstances of
probable truth or falsity. And this is not a permissible standard
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The attention of the trial judge should have been focused, for the
purposes of the Federal Constitution, on the question whether the
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
quirement is no longer as much the protection of individual rights
themselves as it is the direct discipline of the police for using unfair
(illegal) methods on the accused to secure a confession.3
It is currently questionable as to whether the subjective or the
objective test should be applied.34 The most recent decisions of the
Court indicate that a majority of the Court favor the objective
test.3 5 But they are not willing to rely upon it exclusively." Under
this test the issue is no longer whether the police action overcame
behavior of the State's law enforcement officials was such as to
overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions
not freely self-determined-a question to be answered with com-
plete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact spoke the
truth.
"See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959). See generally, Allen, Due Process and State Criminal
Procedures: Another Look, Nw. U.L. Rav. 16, 23-25 (1953); Meltzer,
Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge
and Jury, 21 U. Ciri. L. REv. 317, 343-44 (1954); Way, supra note 20, at
55-56.
8 Compare INBAU & REID, op. cit. supra note 16, with Kamisar, supra
note 3. There is currently a marked split between the Supreme Court
Justices over the question of which theory is proper. Five of the Justices
favor the objective approach (Black, Brennan, Douglas, Goldberg, Warren)
and four favor the so called subjective test (Clark, Harlan, Stewart, White).
See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
" See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Haynes v. Wash-
ington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). The Haynes decision appears
to be conclusive as to this point. There the petitioner was held incommuni-
cado for sixteen hours and the opportunity to see anyone was conditioned
upon his confessing. The particular facts made the case an ideal one for
application of the subjective test. Yet only a passing note was made of
petitioner's prior contacts with police. Failure of the majority to use
the subjective approach in holding the police action violative of due process
evoked a strong dissent by four Justices (per Clark, joined by Harlan,
Stewart, and White). The objective test is the more rational of the two
tests so long as the purpose behind the exclusion of a confession is the
deterrence of the police action that brought about the inadmissible con-
fession. The subjective and objective test are inconsistent in that under
the former the police have everything to gain and nothing to lose in
forcing a confession. Only by the adoption of the objective test is deter-
rence actually realized. For a more complete discussion, see Comment, 31
U. CHI. L. Rv. 313 (1964).
"'Professor Kamisar explains the continued reference to individual
characteristics as follows:
In short, much more often than not, if not always, when the Court
considers the peculiar, individual characteristics of the person
confessing, it is only applying a rule of inadmissibility. "Strong"
personal characteristics rarely, if ever, "cure" forbidden police
methods; but "weak" ones may invalidate what are generally per-
missible methods.
Kamisar, supra note 3, at 758.
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the will of the defendant, but whether the police action was of such a
nature that it could overcome defendant's will.
In Davis the district court and a majority of the court of appeals
applied the subjective test in determining that the defendant's con-
fession was voluntary. The dissent made a strict application of the
objective test and would have excluded the confession. Thus, the
opinions in Davis illustrate the divergent results possible under the
two tests. Perhaps the recognition of two acceptable tests (perhaps
better defined as theories or rationales), both flexible, gives courts
a desirable freedom in judging each factual situation. That the two
tests may dictate different results in a particular case, however,
creates an unfortunate situation: when particular facts are open to
interpretation by an appellate court and no clear physical or psy-
chological pressure is evident, the admissibility of a confession is
determined by the application of one of either of two accepted tests.
Davis is such a case. The situation is further illustrated by the fact
that a majority of the Supreme Court, should it grant certiorari,
would probably apply the objective test and thus possibly exclude the
confession."
In resolving which test is to be applied, the appellate court must
decide for itself what its goal is to be. If it is the condemnation of
police methods that make the criminal procedure an inquisitorial
rather than an accusatorial process, the objective test must be ap-
plied. But if the admissibility of the confession is to depend upon its
truth or falsity, the subjective test applies.
Another aspect of Davis is the pre-confession prayer. Applying
the trustworthiness doctrine to confessions made as a result of
religious inducement, the common law courts held that such con-
fessions were admissible.3" It has been said of such spiritual ex-
hortations that they
seem, from the nature of religion, the most likely of all motives
to produce truth. They are, therefore, of a class entirely different
from those that exclude confessions. A confession is excluded
because the motive which induces it is calculated to produce
untruth-because it is likely to lead to falsehood. If temporal
" See cases cited and text at note 34 supra." 3 WIGMORE § 840 and cases collected therein. "We can therefore
conclude that, as a general rule, confessions which result from spiritual
exhortations or appeals to morality are admissible in evidence, whether in-
duced by a person in authority or by someone else." KAUFAXAN, ADtISSI-
BILIrY oF CONFESSIONs 76 (1960). See generally 6 N.C.L. Rxv. 462 (1928).
[Vol. 43
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hopes exist, they may lead to falsehood. Spiritual hopes can lead
to nothing but truth.39
Not only do some writers disagree with this approach,4" but all
courts have not been in accord. 4' Both the majority and the dis-
sent in Davis contributed to the deterioration of this concept of
trustworthiness. Although the majority held the above principle
binding in Davis, they recognized that a confession arising from
religious influence, whether prompted by a layman or a clergyman,
may be subject to exclusion.' Though dealing with the prayer only
secondarily (sensing in it a diversion), the dissent implied that such
action by police has no place in an accusatorial system and that the
"psuedo [sic] religious ministrations of a policeman" when a minis
ter is readily available clearly cannot withstand the objective test.4
The Supreme Court has never been faced with the issue. But use of
religious adjurations to induce a confession would be hard pressed in
withstanding the objective test as applied by the Court.
RALPH MALLOY McKEITHEN
Evidence--Expert Medical Testimony on Causation
In Lockwood v. McCaskill' the North Carolina Supreme Court
seemingly added another dimension to the could-or-might rule of
admissibility of expert testimony as established in Summerlin v.
Carolina & Northwestern R.R. ' It has been an accepted rule in
"Joy, CONFESSIONS 51-52 (1842)."Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIo ST. L.J.
55 (1963); Note, 1 WASHBURN L. REv. 415 (1961). The latter is the most
complete analysis available regarding the clergyman and coerced confessions.
Cf. REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS (1959).
'E.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Den-
mark v. State, 95 Fla. 757, 116 So. 757 (1928); Johnson v. State, 107
Miss. 196, 65 So. 218 (1914). Forty-four of the states now have a statute
making privileged any communications between a member of the clergy
and a confessant. These statutes are collected in Professor Reese's article.
Reese, supra note 40, at 61 n.22.
339 F.2d at 776.
339 F.2d at 784-85.
'262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
133 N.C. 550, 45 S.E. 898 (1903).
It would be competent for a physician or surgeon, who is properly
qualified to give an opinion, to state that an injury might have been
caused by a fall from a car, or that such a fall, in other words, could
have produced it; but when he is called upon to say that the injury
was caused by the fall from a car, and not by a fall from any other
elevated place, or in any other way that might just as well have pro-
